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A number of recently proposed techniques for aggregating data in P2P
networks suffer in performance under the presence of network churn and
the recently proposed solutions for estimating churn are unable to do so
in a privacy-preserving manner. Following this observation, we present a
method for a robust aggregation method which allows for estimating churn
in an efficient and accurate manner, without compromising node privacy.
Essentially we are taking gossiping and selection techniques usually used
to create network overlays, and use them to aggregate data which can be
used for estimation. The experimental evaluation shows that our approach
is able to estimate a reasonable correct churn in a wide range of churn
scenarios without compromising node privacy.
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Online social networks (OSN) such as Facebook and Twitter have revolu-
tionized how most people use the internet. Hundred of millions of users
are generating staggering volumes of data, which get stored in the servers
of the operators. In 2012 Facebook stored over 500 Terrabyte of new data
daily. At the same time twitter was receiving over 340 million tweets a
month. Since then both companies have continued to grow both in terms
of users, and data generated. In short, we as users, are trusting a huge
amount of personal data to the same domain, making them both more valu-
able, and more vulnerable for attack. The companies themselves make their
lively hood of this data, earning money by offering targeted marketing and
selling statistics about their users and their behaviour to other companies.
Intelligence and law enforcement agencies around the world are routinely
monitoring OSNs finding treasure troves of information. We are trusting
the companies behind the OSNs with a lot, and maybe to much, informa-
tion without really knowing how our information is being used, by both the
companies themselves or by others. Not to mention how criminals could
exploit the information if they where to get hold of it through malicious
attacks or other schemes.
The advantages of users having more control with how their personal
data is being used should be obvious. One of the best ways of ensuring
this would be to give the user the ability to control who should have
access to which information, while nobody else should be aware of the
existence and/or the origin of the information, unless disclosed by one of
participating parties (sender or receiver). To the best of our knowledge,
there are currently no existing large scale OSNs which offers these options
to their users. Not to mention that with a centralized infrastructure, this
would also be hard to realize as the centralised entity would see at least the
communication patterns. However, as proposed by [33] friend-to-friend
networks (described in Section 2.2) such as Freenet have a good potential
to offer users such control.
The protocol presented in [33] is a promising start for a system which
could offer robust privacy-preserving data dissemination over a social
graph. It does however require a method for estimating churn in a privacy
preserving manner. Estimation and aggregation in P2P networks is in itself
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a challenging task, as there are no centralized component which can gather
information from the nodes. The authors of [15] and [13] have proposed
solutions for aggregation in P2P networks, but common for most works
in the area is that performance suffers in the presence of churn. This is of
course a crucial factor when one wants to estimate churn. There are existing
works which do estimate churn in P2P networks, such as [25] and [2], but
these do not consider estimation in a privacy-preserving manner.
To the best of our knowledge privacy-preserving estimation of churn
in large scale P2P networks has yet to be considered by literature. Every
standalone component such as aggregation, churn estimation and privacy
in P2P networks has been considered, but never together. This is our main
contribution with this thesis. We propose a solution for robust privacy-
preserving estimation of churn in large-scale P2P networks.
The privacy-preserving capabilities in [33] come from the use of
pseudonyms with limited lifetime. Nodes will periodically create new
pseudonyms for themselves invalidating old pseudonyms. And unless
there is a trust relation between two nodes, the only way of contacting a
other node is via a valid pseudonym. This enables the creation of a robust
overlay network for data dissemination. Our contribution in this context
is that we offer a solution for churn estimation which makes it virtually
impossible to track individual nodes across multiple pseudonyms, and
by doing so maintain the privacy-preserving capabilities of [33]. Our
work should also lend it self to do privacy-preserving estimation in other
contexts than [33], assuming that there is some mechanism for hiding
individual nodes (like a pseudonym) present.
The gist of our solution is as follows. Every node will keep a set of
estimates from other nodes in the network, including offline nodes. Based
on these estimates and observations about itself it will periodically make
an estimate about the churn in the network and gossip this estimates to
the other nodes so that its estimate can be included into the set of other
nodes. The estimates are calculated as the mean of all observations in
the set and the self observation. By doing this all estimates will converge
toward the same number resulting in only a small deviation among the
estimates. This is crucial as it is this small deviation which forms the
basis for privacy-preserving capabilities of the protocol. By having all
nodes gossip approximately the same values tracking individual nodes
across pseudonyms becomes virtually impossible. The protocol also allows
for changes in the churn pattern without restarting the protocol as nodes
periodically make a new estimate based on both self observation and
estimates from other nodes and then disseminate these changes to their
neighbours. This dissemination is also very robust as it follows the same
principles used to create the robust network overlay.
We also introduce, to the best of our knowledge, a new metric for
evaluating the degree of privacy an anonymity set can provide based on
the probability that two nodes will transmit an indistinguishable value.
The authors of [32] and [8] identified the need for an additional metric
for evaluating the degree of anonymity provided by anonymity sets
beyond the set size. The set size should be coupled with a threshold
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defining whether a entity is within the set or not. However, to the
best of our knowledge there is no literature which provides a generic
way of calculating this threshold for numbers. Having such a metric for
anonymity sets would enable a better basis for comparison of the privacy-
preserving capabilities of different estimation algorithms.
In Chapter 7 we show that our solution is capable of estimating
the mean churn in the network with reasonable accuracy and within a
reasonable amount of time. This holds true in a range of artificially
generated churn scenarios with varying node availability, as well as under
real-life churn using churn traces from [31].
We also show that the protocol proposed by [33] has similar perform-
ance when running our churn estimation protocol than it did when hav-
ing perfect knowledge about the churn. The evaluation of the privacy-
preserving capabilities of our protocol by our new metric also shows satis-
factory results.
Finally we identify some properties with our proposed solution which
might deserve some future attention if one wishes to use our solution in a
real-life scenario.
Thesis structure
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows: We first describe some of
the key concepts and terminology used in this thesis in Chapter 2. This
is followed by the related work in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4 we describe
the application context in which the work in this thesis is done, before we
describe the problem we wish to solve in Chapter 5. Our proposed solution
is presented in Chapter 6 and evaluated according to our performance
metrics both of which are found in Chapter 7. Finally we draw our





In this section we explain and describe some of the terminology and
key concepts which we use either for explaining or evaluating the work
presented in this thesis. These are brief introductions and are meant as a
complete explanation of the topics, but they are meant to give sufficient
information to understand what is being presented.
2.1 Peer to peer networks
Peer to peer (P2P) networks are a class of decentralized distributed
networks where nodes (peers) supply and consume resources. P2P
networks distinguish themselves from more traditional layer-3 networks in
many ways. They tend to be highly dynamic, having a high join and leave
rate, as peers periodically come online and go offline. They usually do
not have the hierarchical topology of traditional networks, which typically
comes form how devices are physically connected to each other (and by
which role these devices have).
Instead a P2P networks are logical networks, where the topology of
how peers are connected to each other is determined by some logical
or random factor. P2P networks also tend to be either partially or fully
decentralized networks where the network does not rely on a known
ever-present entity (such as a internet server). Or as in the case of a
partially decentralised network relies on the centralized component as
little as possible and typically only in the start up/join phase. Another
distinguishing feature of P2P networks, is that peers are generally speaking
treated as equals. This means that they are operating both as servers
and clients towards the other nodes, and are expected to be able to take
different roles in the network as the situation requires. By comparison, in
more traditional networks participants usually have clearly defined roles
in terms of who is the server and who is the client, not to mention which
role they have in the topology.
It is worth noting that P2P networks still require some physical medium
to communicate with each other. This will in most cases be a traditional
hierarchical network (for instance the internet) or some sort of wireless
sensor network. When talking about protocols running in P2P networks
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or P2P networks in general in this thesis, we assume that the underlying
communication is present and that the P2P network acts as middle-ware
between the transport layer and the application layer of the TCP/IP stack.
The lack of (or limited use of) a centralized component is one of
the features which makes P2P networks attractive from a connectivity
perspective. If one does not rely on a central structure (such as a server)
one is avoiding single points of failure. The drawback of not having
such a centralized structure is that joining a P2P network in the first place
becomes difficult for peers. To join a P2P system they would have to know
the address (IP or similar) of at least one of the peers which is already
connected to the network, and at least one of these peers needs to be online
at the time of connection. This is the reason why most P2P networks that
exist today have some centralized component which helps nodes which
want to join the P2P network to find other peers which are online at the
present time (bit-torrent trackers are an example of a well know centralized
component).
Continuing the train of thought of wanting to avoid relying on a
centralized component, creating and maintaining an efficient network
topology for the P2P network becomes a task the peers have to share
between themselevs. Literature has yet to come up with a definitive answer
to how this should be done, and there have been, and still are, a multitude
of techniques proposed for the best way of doing this. Classifying different
techniques for creating and maintaining network topology in P2P networks
would be a mammoth task, but solutions generally fall into one of two main
categories in regard to network topology: structured and unstructured
networks.
2.1.1 Structured P2P networks
Structured P2P networks try, as the name implies, to create a specific
structure as a network overlay. The general idea is to create some form
of hierarchy that allows for efficient routing between the peers. The
creation of a hierarchy allows nodes to determine their role in the network
and ideally creates an even work load for all the participating peers.
Maintaining the hierarchy can require a lot of additional computations
and/or messages, especially if peers leave and join a lot, however it brings
with it the advantages of a deterministic scheme to do so. A deterministic
scheme also makes it easier to provide guarantees in form of guaranteed
message delivery to all peers etc. Node placement in the hierarchy is
often determined by peer ID or some proximity metric between nodes.
Distributed Hash Tables, like described in [1], is a typical example of
structured P2P networks.
2.1.2 Unstructured P2P networks
By contrast the unstructured P2P networks do not follow a predefined
scheme for crating the network overlay. Instead, links are most commonly
created in a more random fashion, as for instance in Gnutella. Unstructured
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P2P networks typically have the advantage of spending less computations
and messages to maintain the network overlay. This is an advantage
for large networks, and networks which are highly dynamic or networks
which are both large and highly dynamic. They are often designed
to support rapid information dissemination, however give less or no
guarantees about all information reaching all peers. This means that
unstructured P2P networks often requires additional mechanisms if high
probability for reaching all nodes with information is required.
2.2 Friend to friend networks
Friend to friend (F2F) networks are a type of P2P network where
participants can only make direct contact with peers with whom they
are friends. The topology of the network is equal that of the social
graph, having links between the nodes only where there exists a relation
of friendship. The general idea is that if you only communicate with
people you are friends with and trust, you are not disclosing information
about yourself or your resources to outsiders, who you might not trust.
Information can be disseminated through the network and to nodes which
are not friends by having common friends relaying messages. This means
that if a node wishes to disseminate a message to everybody in the network,
it will send the message to all its friends, and then have all friends forward
the message to all their friends, and so on.
Another important feature is that if a node is relaying a message from
one friend to another, it does not know (nor should it) if the friend sending
the message is the original sender of the message, nor if the friend to which
the message is forwarded is the final recipient. So in essence the purpose
of a F2F network is to create a P2P network where it is hard or impossible
to track who has which resources, and who is spending which resources.
Freenet [7] is a good example of a F2F network.
2.3 Gossiping
Gossiping, also known as epidemic dissemination, is a widely used scheme
for disseminating information in P2P networks. Node a can tell node b a
piece of information which node b in turn can spread to all its neighbours
in the network which in turn can tell their neighbours. It can be compared
to infecting nodes with information which in turn infect their neighbours,
like a virus would do, hence the term epidemic dissemination.
2.4 Churn and models for churn
Churn which is the short form of churn rate, is a metric used to describe
how many nodes leave or join a network over a period of time. If a network
has a high churn rate (or high churn) the number of nodes that leave and
join the network is high, usually indicating that nodes leave frequently,
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either to rejoin the network at a later point or to be replaces by new nodes.
A network with a low churn rate will usually have nodes which are online
for a significant amount of time and seldom or never leave the network.
There are currently two main ways of defining the churn rate in P2P
networks. The first is to consider churn as the number of nodes which
leave or join the network in a given time interval. This can be interesting
knowledge if one for instance has to adapt the overlay to include new
nodes and remove nodes which have left. This is a good way of measuring
churn if one assumes that a lot of nodes will not return to the network, or
return so infrequently, that it does not pay to keep track of them. Methods
for calculating churn in such networks have been proposed in for instance
[9] and [11].
The other main way of seeing churn, and the one which we are using in
this thesis, is to see how long nodes remain connected to, and disconnected
from, the network. The basic assumption is that nodes will at some point,
within a reasonable amount of time, rejoin the network because they have
strong incentives for doing so (resource sharing etc). This knowledge can
then be used to for instance make better decisions about how to create the
network overlay. A nodes online time is usually described as its Ton time
and its offline time Toff time.
2.5 Random graph
A random graph is a graph that can be created by taking a set of isolated
nodes and then randomly adding edges between them. In many systems
described in literature, as well as in this thesis, authors try to achieve a
overlay that resembles a random graph. The reason for trying to achieve a
random graph is that random graphs have some desirable characteristics
which we are interested in when designing an unstructured overlay
network.
The probability that a random graph remains connected even though
you remove a high number of edges (nodes that have left the system/are
offline) is very high, given that each node has sufficient edges. This
means that we will have a connected overlay even though the churn in
the network is high. Another desirable property of a random graph is that
it scales well, or to be precise, you can double the number of nodes without
having to increase the out-degree of individual nodes by much, and still
maintain the same probabilities for connectivity.
This scalability in number of nodes without increasing system complex-
ity is also one of the strong suits of many unstructured overlay networks
and is one of the reasons why random graphs lend themselves particularly
well to these kind of networks. One of the more comprehensive works on
random graphs and their properties is [3], and more details and reasoning
about random graphs can be found there.
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2.6 Standard deviation
Standard deviation is a statistical property which shows how much
numerical variation there exists from the mean in a set of numbers. A low
standard deviation means that most values are close to the mean, while
a high standard deviation means that the numbers in the set are spread
over a large range of values. Say that the mean (average) height of all men
in Norway is 180 cm. If the standard deviation is 3 (assuming normal
distribution), this means that 68% of all Norwegian men have a height
within +/- 3 cm of 180 cm (they are between 177 and 183 cm high), and
95% of all Norwegian men will have a height within +/- 6 cm (2x standard
deviation) of 180 cm.

















Generated node availability CDF
Figure 2.1: CDF example: CDF distribution of availability
Cumulative distribution function, or CDF for short, is a statistical
property which describes the probability that a random variable x can
with a given probability be found at a value equal to, or less than, y.
Figure 2.1 is an example of how a CDF distribution can be visualized.
We are showing the CDF distribution for node availability which has a
mean availability of 20%. We can read from the Figure that the probability
that a randomly selected node has an availability equal to, or less than,
0.3 is about 80%. This in turn tells us that the majority of nodes for
this availability distribution have relatively low availability. A plot of






In this chapter we present some of the recent literature which is relevant
for this thesis, and present our views on their strengths and weaknesses.
3.1 Distributed aggregation
All good estimates are based on relevant information. The more relevant
information one can assemble the better an estimate can potentially be. To
assemble relevant information we aggregate data.
Aggregation in large-scale dynamic distributed systems, such as P2P
systems, has been well studied in the past. Solutions typically fall into
one of two main categories, hierarchical or gossip based solutions. The
hierarchical approaches such as [10, 16, 34, 37] are distinguishable by nodes
getting organized in tree-like structures and messages getting passed up
and down the tree structure. This allows for high accuracy in aggregation
with relatively low cost in terms of workload and message-passing once
the tree-like structure is created, but requires a lot of messages to maintain
the structure in the presence of node churn.
The gossip based approach, such as [13–15, 23, 30], generally speaking
rely on exchanging information with randomly selected neighbours. This
probabilistic approach is more scalable than the hierarchical approach as it
does not require the creation of tree-like structures, but is less accurate as it
is probabilistic. In this thesis we will focus on the gossip based approaches
because we wish to do estimation in an unstructured P2P network.
Finding or creating an good aggregation technique is crucial for finding
a good solution for churn estimation. In the following section we are taking
a closer look at some aggregation techniques which potentially could be
used as the basis for our own aggregation and point out why we like them
and some problems which have to be overcome if we wish to use them in
our estimation.
3.1.1 Gossip-based aggregation
Gossip based aggregation of global parameters in P2P networks such as
avg, sum, min, max is a problem which has been studied in many scenarios.
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One of the most referenced works in the area is [15]. The idea is simple
but effective. Whenever two nodes gossip, node a will send its value Xa to
node b which in return sends its value Xb to a. The nodes then update their
value to be (Xa + Xb)/2 (mean), min/max(Xa, Xb) or something similar
for desired effect. The effect of min/max is obvious. In the case of mean,
the idea is that with every gossip interaction the values held by individual
nodes becomes less extreme until finally converging on the mean for the
entire system.
It is worth noting that how fast the system will converge is dependent
on how the nodes choose to gossip. Choosing nodes in a fashion which
ensures short path lengths in the graph is generally better than choosing
gossiping partners which create long path lengths (at least if we disregard
constructed scenarios where nodes will choose gossiping partners based on
how far away they are from the mean).
The main problem of the algorithm, especially for aggregating the
mean, is churn. If a node for some reason leaves the network before the
system has converged, the system can not converge to the correct value
(which is the mean of all nodes online at the beginning of the run). The
earlier a node leaves the more off the result will be. This because the
value held by the node has been considered less than others. Equally, if
nodes would be allowed to join the averaging while in progress the system
would never converge (as long as new nodes are being added), nor would
it converge to the correct value (unless by chance).
To address these issues one would typically run multiple parallel
instances of the algorithm and compare results between runs, which
can compensate for nodes leaving, while prohibiting nodes from joining
instances which started before they joined the network. However even
this would not guarantee a convergence in networks with high churn as
the chance of a significant amount of nodes leaving the network early in a
aggregation cycle is high, skewing the results.
Other proposed solutions worth mentioning are [12] and [17]. They
have commonalities with [15] but offer better domain specific solutions for
aggregation in terms of either message overhead or convergence. They do
however suffer from the same disadvantages in terms of behaviour under
churn and need to periodically restart as [15] does.
Another interesting approach to aggregation is the approach presented
in [13]. The basic idea is that each node is maintaining a sample of
values. During each round of gossiping nodes exchange samples and then
updating their own selection of samples with values from the gossiping.
Exploring some different scenarios for merging samples, ranging from
random replacement to different schemes for merging with the goal of
storing the maximum amount of information with the minimum amount
of space required they found some interesting properties. The clever
approaches which captured more data, where more accurate than the
simpler approaches such as random replacement. They also determined
that the presence of duplicates (that a value from a single node gets
included multiple times into the same sample) has a relatively small effect
on accuracy. Thus one could potentially neglect to track which nodes
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are already included into samples allowing for simpler algorithms. The
main advantages with the technique presented is that one does not need
to keep track of individual nodes when selecting samples, and if using
clever techniques for merging samples one can achieve quite accurate
results with minimum message overhead. The main drawbacks are that the
protocol would have to be restarted at certain time intervals to get updated
information, and that there is no data on how this system would preform
under the presence of churn.
3.2 Churn estimation
The effects of churn on P2P networks have been studied in many scenarios
such as in [18–20], and there has been quite a few studies on how to
minimize the impact of churn on P2P networks [21, 26, 29]. However, to
the best of our knowledge there has not been so many studies focusing on
how to estimate the amount of churn in a P2P network, though there are
some [2, 9, 11, 25].
Understanding how churn impacts a P2P systems is important as
many aggregation techniques are also suffering in performance under the
presence of churn. This is also why estimating churn is a potentially
even more challenging task than estimating other properties in a P2P
system. In the following sections we take a closer look at a few of the
recently proposed solutions for estimating churn in P2P networks. We are
again focusing on analysing their strong-suits and weaknesses looking for
possible solutions to our problem, or issues which needs to be resolved to
create a working solution.
3.2.1 Estimating leaves and joins
As described in Section 2.4 one of the two main ways of modelling churn is
to see how many nodes leave and join the network within a certain period
of time. In [9], and similarly in [11], the authors propose a way of doing
just this. In stead of counting the exact number of leaves and joins in
the network, they instead propose to monitor the join and departure rate
relative to the size of the network. The join/departure rate for a given
time period l would be the number of joined/departed nodes within that
time period divided by the number of nodes in the network. This is done
in the following manner: Given an arbitrary P2P network where every
node maintains a fixed number of overlay neighbours C, every node which
does not leave or join the network within the fixed time period l, monitors
and records all nodes departing or joining the network. Joining nodes
are monitored by requiring every node to send a special JOIN message to
an online node at the time of joining (or rejoining) the network. A node
can detect departing nodes by monitoring the neighbouring nodes in C.
Once the period l is over, all nodes which did not depart or join within l
calculate the relative join and departure rate as joins/C and departures/C.
The nodes then average these values across the network giving the relative
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global join and departure rate. The neat thing about this approach is that
it will give a fairly accurate estimate of the relative global leave and join
rate within a certain time interval, without prior knowledge of the size
of the network. This is important as estimating the size of the network
is in it self an aggregation challenge in P2P networks. The approach also
has the advantage of working regardless of how the underlying network
overlay is created, as long as how often each individual node appears in the
overlay links of the other nodes is not too skewed. The main drawback is
that to work, the system requires some sort of synchronisation mechanism
between nodes so that they can agree on when and how long individual
instances of l are. To always have access to up to date information one
would also have to run multiple parallel and continuous instances of the
protocol.
3.2.2 Estimating Ton and Toff
A solution for estimating churn in terms of Ton and Toff in structured
P2P networks is proposed in [2]. The idea is that each node will maintain
a set of observations from a selection of nodes, creating a sample set
of observations, and then making its estimate based on this set of
observations. The observations can either come from the nodes observing
their neighbours in the overlay, or by nodes reporting observations about
themselves to their neighbours. In either case a node will, given time,
get a set of observations about its neighbours. The bigger this set is, the
more accurate the estimation can be, as it is based on more information.
However, a bigger set will take more time to collect and will potentially
contain more stale information if one does not take steps to ensure
freshness. By stale information we in this case mean observations which
are so old that they are no longer relevant. Thus the set size becomes a
trade-off between accuracy and message complexity.
The approach has the benefit of working with a wide range of different
overlays. In [2] they use a structured overlay network, however there is to
the best of our knowledge nothing that prevents this approach from being
used in other forms of overlay networks. Though there has to be some
mechanism for selecting sample sets in such a way that each node appears
with approximately the same frequency across all sets.
As pointed out in [2], when a node estimates the system wide mean
Ton or Toff by calculating the mean of the observations in its set it does
not guarantee a correct estimate for all nodes. However the mean of all
estimates should be the same as (or close to) the mean of all individual
observations. And the bigger the observation sets are, the smaller the
deviation among the estimates should be. Another advantage of the
algorithm is that it will adapt to changes in churn without running multiple
instances, as the observations can be updated over time. It also does not
require any special synchronisation mechanisms unless the observation
metric requires this. The main drawback of the proposed solution is that
all nodes do not estimate the same correct value, which for some systems
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might be crucial.
3.3 Evaluating privacy in networks
Our goal is to come up with a method for estimating churn in a privacy-
preserving manner. This presents an interesting conundrum. Estimation
relies on aggregation which means that information needs to be disclosed
and exchanged. Disclosing information about oneself is not something one
would usually do when trying to preserve privacy. Hence we need a way
for nodes to disclose information which does not compromise privacy.
Privacy and anonymity are two closely related terms. One being
slightly weaker than the other. If nodes can remain anonymous they
are also privacy-preserving, but preserving privacy is not equivalent to
being anonymous. Hence, we are aiming for anonymity, but can settle for
privacy-preserving. Our notion of privacy is further described in Chapter
7.4.
When trying to achieve anonymous communication on the internet
there are mainly two approaches one can take. You can either use
cryptography like proposed in for instance [6] or try to blend into the
crowd making observers uncertain of your actions like proposed in [5].
Cryptography can be an effective approach when one wishes to hide what
one is communicating (for example VPN), but does in it self not hide
who you are communicating with. This makes applying cryptography to
hide the identity of a node a less likely approach to succeed. We need
the information which is transmitted, but wish to hide who is sending
it. This leads us to the other main approach for achieving anonymous
communications. Trying to hide who is communicating with whom is
typically done by gathering a mass of users into a crowd, where tracking
individuals gets almost impossible.
In [5] they introduced the term anonymity set as a metric for the
amount of anonymity provided in such a crowd. The idea being that
if an individual in the set sent a message, nobody inside or outside
the set should know the message’s origin for certain, except the actual
sender. Thus staying anonymous comes down to probabilities and a large
anonymity set is the goal.
Over the years there have been several techniques proposed for creating
an anonymous internet experience for internet users. Both [27] and [28]
propose possible approaches for users to create a large anonymity sets
for themselves, and in recent years the P2P based TOR network [22] has
become a working practical solution for being virtually untraceable on the
internet.
The aim of having an anonymity set which is as big as possible is a
good principle, but has some issues which should to be considered. The
main issue is that there to the best of our knowledge does not exist any strict
definitions on how to determine which nodes qualify to be in an anonymity
set. In theory any node which has the potential of being mistaken for the
node which is trying to hide could be considered as a part of the anonymity
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set of that node, there is however one major problem with this definition.
Think of the following scenario. Say you and 10 friends are running a
mixing protocol which is poorly designed, and you send a message where
you do not wish to be identified as the sender. An external observer
is observing outgoing messages from your mixing pool, but is still able
to estimate which messages originally come from you with a very high
probability due to the poor design. Your friends are technically still a part
of your anonymity set as there still remains some slight chance that they
where the originators of the message, but for all practical purposes they
should probably not be included in your anonymity set as the probability
for you being the originator is so high. This weakness in definition was
pointed out by the authors of both [32] and [8], and hence we need a stricter
definition for our anonymity sets.
In [24] they define anonymity as: ”Anonymity is the state of being not
identifiable within a set of subjects, the anonymity set”. Using this definition
the authors of [32] and [8] identified that it is important to consider
the probability an attacker would assign to each individual entity in the
anonymity set for being the originator of a message. In particular [8] also
identified that within an anonymity set each entity should ideally have the
same probability for being the originator to provide maximum anonymity.
Hence both probability of identification and set size should be taken into
consideration when evaluating an anonymity set. And a strong anonymity
set provides many nodes which all would be assigned a high probability
of being mistakenly identified as the node for which the anonymity set is
being provided. To the best of our knowledge there does not exist any
definition for how the strength of an anonymity set should calculated when




We wish to build the basis for a robust privacy-preserving protocol for data
dissemination in a delay-tolerant network. Such a protocol could in turn be
used to build for instance an OSN which offers the users more control and
privacy from both internal and external observers, as well as threat from
leaks (malicious or otherwise), than current centralized solution do. In this
Chapter we present the proposed solution for creating such a system as
presented by [33]. This will be the application context for this thesis.
4.1 A robust privacy-preserving protocol for data dis-
semination
As pointed out in [33] F2F networks form a good basis for designing
privacy-preserving protocols because they provide a lot of user privacy.
Friends can only communicate with other friends so if a node adds new
friends to the network this is of little concern for other nodes as long as
they trust their friends not to disclose information about them. This is
because additional friends of node a will have no direct way of contacting
node b by any other means than having a common friend relaying the
message. Equally, information originating from node a can not be seen by
other than friends of a unless one of them breaks its trust and forwards
the information to their friends. Information can be forwarded but the
originator can not be found or tracked unless a node which has a trust
relation with the originator discloses its identity. This makes F2F networks
highly scalable. On the other hand, one of the biggest drawbacks with a
F2F network is that they typically do not have a layout which allows for
efficient disseminating of messages across the network, as most other P2P
networks do. Neither are F2F networks, which typically resemble a social
graph, as strong in terms of connectivity as other P2P networks typically
are, and could easily become disconnected even under a modest churn.
Hence the idea of [33] is that to create a protocol which takes a social
graph (F2F network) and supplements it with additional links to give it
the robustness of a P2P network with an overlay resembling a random
graph. The desired effect is illustrated in Figure 4.1. The problem with
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designing such a system from that the additional links which have to be
created to supplement the social graph, are between nodes which do not
trust each other. This means that they have to be made in a manner which
does not disclose node identities while still providing an abstraction for
robust privacy-preserving routing. By combining the robustness from the
P2P world with the privacy-preserving capabilities of the F2F network [33]
proposes to create an efficient, scalable, reliable and privacy-preserving
protocol which can be used for data dissemination.
Trusted overlay links
 Extra overlay links
Trusted edges
Figure 4.1: Example of a trust graph and derived communication overlay
presented in [33]
4.2 Privacy guarantees
Under the assumption that no participating node will intentionally disclose
its own participation or the participation of any of its trusted peers in
the network, [33] defines a privacy-preserving system which provides the
following guarantees.
First and foremost, nobody outside the network is able to determine
who is participating in the network nor are they able to join the network
without establishing a trust relationship with at least one node already
inside the network. The only information a node has about the network
is its own list of trusted peers.
Secondly the system does not disclose the edges in the trust graph to an
entity monitoring the system with a high probability. If node a trusts node
b and node c, node a is unable to determine whether or not node b trusts
node c.
Third, the data disseminated through the network is readable only to
the members of the network.
20



















Figure 4.2: Architecture for privacy-preserving data dissemination presen-
ted in [33]
To create a protocol which would satisfy the criteria described in Section
4.1, the authors of [33] propose a three layered approach (Figure 4.2), where
the lowest layer (privacy-preserving link layer) consists of an anonymity
service and a pseudonym service. The anonymity service is responsible
for providing privacy-preserving end to end communication between two
nodes with known IDs (trusted links). The pseudonym service on the other
hand is there to provide privacy-preserving end to end communication
to a node whose pseudonym is known by the sending node (pseudonym
links). These services have some additional requirements which are not
relevant for the working of the algorithm but are related to the definition of
privacy Section 4.2. It is also worth noting that how these services should
be realized falls outside the scope of both [33] and this work.
The next layer, called the overlay layer, is responsible for creating and
maintaining the network overlay. Overlay links are considered the union
between trusted links and pseudonym links. When a node rejoins the system
it will re-establish the overlay links it had before leaving. In the same
way links to nodes which have become offline are not removed from the
overlay and will again be operational if the node rejoins the system. Hence,
the system does not provide guarantees for individual links but gets its
robustness from redundancy given by the collection of links.
Trusted links are considered as static links for the purposes of this work,
and maintaining them is hence a straight forward operation. Nodes joining
the system for the first time will not have any pseudonym links, but will
have to rely on the trusted links as its initial overlay. To create, spread and
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remove pseudonym links the overlay layer runs a maintenance protocol
which has schemes for creating, removing and propagating pseudonyms.
Pseudonyms are created with a limited lifetime to enhance privacy.
The scheme for creating and removing pseudonyms is described in further
detail in Section 4.3.1. Pseudonyms are disseminated throughout the
overlay using a gossiping algorithm, and each individual node runs
a sampling algorithm across the gossiped pseudonyms to select which
pseudonyms should be in its overlay links with the goal of having an overlay
that resembles a random graph. The gossiping is described in Section 4.3.2
and the sampling in Section 4.3.3.
The overlay layer is also responsible for providing higher layers a way
to communicate with the nodes in the overlay, but how this is done falls
outside the scope of this work.
4.3.1 Creating and removing pseudonyms
The first time a node joins the system it creates a pseudonym to represent
itself. Pseudonyms always have a limited lifetime to enhance privacy (see
Chapter 5 for more details), and any pseudonym that expires will become
invalid and is removed from the system. When a node’s pseudonym
expires it will create a new pseudonym for itself if it is online (or it
will create one once it again joins the network). The pseudonym service
guarantees that pseudonyms remain valid even though the node that
created it goes offline. It also ensures that a node can be contacted again
through the service once it rejoins the system given that the pseudonym
has not expired.
4.3.2 Gossiping pseudonyms
Gossiping is done using the shuffling idea presented in [35]. Every node
maintains a pseudonym cache of configurable size n. In the beginning the
cache is empty. Periodically every node selects a uniformly random link
from its overlay links or pseudonym cache. The node a then executes the
shuffling protocol with the selected node b as the target. a and b then
exchange messages with each other containing a sample of up to l (which
is also configurable) number of pseudonyms. The sample will include up
to l-1 pseudonyms from the nodes cache, and the nodes own pseudonym
(less if there are not sufficient pseudonyms in the cache). The replacement
policy is also similar to the one described in [35]. Upon receiving a number
of pseudonyms a node will first fill the cache. If the cache is full a node
will then replace the pseudonyms which it just sent to its gossiping partner
with the newly received pseudonyms, while removing any duplicates or
occurrences of its own pseudonym. This means that with every shuffle a
node will, with high likelihood, replace at least some of its cache with new
pseudonyms ensuring dissemination of the pseudonyms. In addition to
applying the sample to the cache, nodes will run the sampling mechanism
described in Section 4.3.3 whenever it shuffles.
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4.3.3 Selecting pseudonym links
Sample selection for the overlay links is done by the principles outlined
by [4]. Every node keeps configurable number of links s which make out
the pseudonym links. The bigger s is the more robust the overlay will be.
However, every additional link creates more computational complexity to
maintain. In addition we keep a small number of potential candidates for
each pseudonym link q. The goal is to create a network overlay which
resembles a random graph (which is good for robustness) which allows for
fast pseudonym link replacement when a pseudonym expires. This is done
in the following manner:
To each pseudonym link slot we attach a uniformly random number,
and either a pseudonym or an empty value. Every pseudonym has a
uniformly random number attached to it. Whenever a node receives
a pseudonym, for all pseudonyms that the node currently knows of, it
considers the following when deciding which pseudonyms should be a
part of the pseudonym links:
1. If a pseudonym has expired, discard it.
2. If a pseudonym link has an empty value attached to it, replace the
empty value with the pseudonym.
3. If a pseudonym’s value is numerically closer to the value attached to
the pseudonym link than to the value held by the current pseudonym,
replace the existing pseudonym with the new one. The former
holder becomes the head of the queue for potential candidates of that
pseudonym link, booting the last one if the queue is full.
4. If a pseudonym’s value is not closer to the value attached to the
pseudonym link than the current pseudonym, consider it for a slot
among the potential candidates to this pseudonym link. Candidates
are ranked by numerical closeness.
5. In case of a tie between two or more pseudonyms for a link overlay
slot or a potential candidate slot, the pseudonym with the longest
remaining pseudonym lifetime is chosen first.
Note that pseudonyms can appear multiple times in the overlay, both










In [33], which is summarized in Chapter 4, they proposed a system for
robust privacy-preserving data dissemination. They did however make
multiple assumptions. In this thesis we are addressing how nodes can be
able to correctly estimate the amount of churn in the system. In short,
we are trying to solve how to estimate mean Toff in the system without
compromising node privacy.
5.1 Pseudonym lifetime and privacy
Privacy in [33] is mainly achieved by use of pseudonyms. Pseudonyms
are a good way of staying concealed, however they become easier to
debunk the longer they last, so short lifespans are preferably. The
drawback of having short pseudonym lifespans is that the system uses
the pseudonym links to create and maintain a robust network overlay.
Changing pseudonyms to often would result in a larger message overhead
to maintain the overlay and would at some point result in a less
robust network. Experiments shown in [33] showed that a pseudonym
lifetime of three times the mean Toff time in the system was a good
pseudonym lifetime as far as connectivity is concerned, and no significant
improvements in connectivity was achieved by increasing the pseudonym
lifetime. If we assume that a pseudonym lifetime of three times the mean
Toff time in the system also is an acceptable value for privacy preservation
we must conclude that making a system as proposed in [33] is possible as
long as we can estimate the mean Toff in the system in a privacy preserving
manner.
5.2 Estimating mean Toff time in a privacy-preserving
manner
As privacy-preservations is a key requirement for the existing protocol, the
estimations should be done in such a way that they do not disclose inform-
ation that would compromise node privacy. From a privacy-preservation
point of view, dissemination of observations should preferably only go
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through the trust graph. This would be equal to do dissemination in a F2F
network and we could use any aggregation algorithm without comprom-
ising privacy. The drawbacks of disseminating only over the trust graph
is that F2F networks typically have longer path-lengths than other P2P
networks, and are highly vulnerable to churn. Hence in terms of conver-
gence speed we would preferably do any aggregation over a random graph
which is robust to churn and has short path-lengths (as we do not have a
structured overlay), meaning that aggregation should preferably be done
with the help of the privacy-preserving overlay links. This would enable
us to for instance use approach presented in [2]. However, doing so would
disclose information over the untrusted links which could harm privacy
as one could track nodes across pseudonyms through the values they re-
port. Hence we need a protocol which can communicate over the privacy-
preserving links without disclosing information which can be used to track
the identity of individual nodes across pseudonyms and hence comprom-
ise the privacy-preserving capabilities of the existing protocol. Our notion
of privacy-preserving is described in Section 4.2.
5.2.1 Formal problem statement
The problem that need to be solved is as follows: Given a protocol
which allows for robust privacy-preserving for data dissemination, create
a protocol which allows for a reasonable accurate estimation of the mean
Toff times across all nodes in network, while satisfying the following main
criteria:
• Privacy-preserving estimation: Estimating churn should not disclose
the identities of nodes, nor the relations between them.
• Robustness: The protocol should be able to give accurate estimates
under the presence of realistic churn.
• Has fast convergence: A protocol that does not converge in reasonable




We are trying to solve the problem of estimating mean Toff time in a privacy
preserving manner with the work presented in [33] as our application
context. In this chapter we first discuss which considerations have to be
made when designing a protocol for this context in Section 6.1, followed
by which assumptions where made when designing the protocol in Section
6.2. We then go on to present our solution in Section 6.3 followed by the
reasoning behind our choices in Section 6.4. In Section 6.6 we elaborate
on how our approach could be applied in other contexts and which
considerations have to be taken if doing so. We finally make a brief
summary of our solution in Section 6.7.
6.1 Design considerations
There are some key issues that need to be addressed when trying to
estimate churn in a P2P network. Like all estimates we want as much
relevant data as possible to make a good estimate, which means that we
need to aggregate data from nodes across the network. Aggregating data
in P2P networks is not a new problem, and as presented in Section 3.1 there
are multiple possible solutions.
One of the main properties which makes estimating churn different
than estimating other properties in a P2P network is that we are also
interested in the properties from nodes which are not currently online.
This is especially true when churn is modelled as Ton and Toff times as
we want actual values, not the leave/join rate as in [25]. In [2] estimating
churn as Ton/Toff is being solved by considering values from a selection
of currently online nodes, however we would preferably also include
information about currently offline nodes as we assume that they are
rejoining the system at some point. This creates another problem which
has to be considered. How long should information about offline nodes be
kept and included in our estimates? This needs to be addressed because
some nodes will in reality never return to the system or even if they return,
the information the system has kept in the mean time will be stale and
might no longer reflect the behaviour of the offline node.
Next we need to consider how to deal with changing node behaviour.
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We can not expect a node to always follow one pattern, and hence a
node’s mean Ton and Toff time will change over time. In [15] and [25]
the authors propose to solve this problem by periodically rerunning the
protocol (preferably in a concurrent manner as to always have up to date
estimates), this however adds a lot of extra complexity especially in the
presence of churn. It also requires some sort of synchronisation mechanism
which also adds complexity. Hence we would preferably device a system
which can deal with changing node values in a single instance of the
protocol, and still be accurate.
Lastly we need to consider how to do estimation and aggregation over
the privacy preserving links without compromising node privacy, and un-
dermine the strength of the pseudonyms, meaning that an attacker should
not be able to track individual nodes across instances of pseudonyms by
the values it is transmitting.
Summing up, our protocol for estimating churn should have the
following properties:
• A way for nodes to choose a data set for the estimates which includes
values from offline nodes
• A way of limiting the time values from offline nodes are kept in the
set
• An efficient way of aggregating data values for the use in estimation
• A way of updating aggregation data values without having to restart
the protocol
• A way of aggregating data for estimation without compromising
node privacy
6.2 Assumptions
We assume that nodes have the ability to observe their own behaviour
pattern, and can calculate its own mean Toff time. We have implemented
this capability by having each node store the last x Toff times it has observed
about itself, and then calculating the mean of these x observations. This
scheme is quite simple and more complex algorithms could be applied if
necessary but for this work we found this to be sufficient.
We assume that all nodes are behaving according to the protocol and
that no Byzantine behaviour is present, maliciously or otherwise.
The solution is set within the application context described in Chapter
4 and we assume the presence of every aspect described in [33], especially
regarding pseudonyms, overlay creation and overlay maintenance. A brief
description of these are given in Section 4.3.
The only difference from the assumptions made in [33] is the prior




Table 6.1: Definitions used for describing the algorithm
Parameter Description
O A node’s observation about its own Toff time
TN A node’s trusted peers
PseudoEstimateSet A node’s selected set of pseudonyms which has a configurable size
PseudoCache A node’s cache of pseudonyms for gossiping which has a configurable size
PseudoGossip A set of pseudonyms sent when gossiping which has a configurable size
P A node’s pseudonym
T The lifetime of a pseudonym
E A node’s estimate of the mean Toff in the system
C A logical counter for an estimate indicating how new its age
i A uniformly random number.
Table 6.2: Properties of a node
Parameter Description
O Its observation about its own Toff time
TN The trusted peers
PseudoEstimateSet The set of pseudonyms used for estimation
PseudoCache The cache of pseudonyms for gossiping
P The pseudonym
Table 6.3: Properties of a pseudonym
Parameter Description
T The lifetime of a pseudonym
i The pseudonym’s ID
{E, C} pair E is an estimate made by the holder of P
C is a logical counter indicating when E was made
Our solution for the problem described in Chapter 5 is reusing many of
the elements found in the protocol described by [33]. We first describe our
solution using the abbreviations presented in Table 6.1, before presenting
the reasoning behind our choices in Section 6.4.
The pseudonyms have the same properties as the pseudonyms de-
scribed in Section 4.3.1, and the PseudoCache is equal to pseudonym cache
described in Section 4.3.2. The gossiping algorithm is also the same. The
PseudoEstimateSet described in Table 6.1 is equal to the pseudonym links
described in Section 4.3 and the sample selection is done in the same man-
ner as described in Section 4.3.3. This means that the same pseudonyms
are being gossiped and the same pseudonym links are selected as in [33].
Essentially the network overlay is the same as before, and the estimation
protocol is as robust as the overlay as they are for all practical purposes the
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same. What is new are the addition of estimates, self observations and lo-
gical counters indicating estimation time. It is also new that the pseudonym
lifetimes are determined by the estimation in stead of prior knowledge of
churn. Table 6.2 defines the data structures of a node, and Table 6.3 defines
the properties which are attached to a pseudonym.
6.3.1 Initial state of a node
• PseudoEstimateSet and PseudoCache will not contain any pseud-
onyms
• O will hold a default value
• E will be equal to O
• The node will create a pseudonym (P) for itself
• The lifetime (T) of that pseudonym will be thee times E
6.3.2 Updating O
Whenever a node becomes online after a period of absence it will
recalculate its own O after the principles described in Section 6.2.
6.3.3 Calculating E
E is calculated as the mean of O and the Es which are attached to the
Ps in the PseudoEstimateSet. This is calculated as E = (O + SUM(E in
PseudoEstimateSet) / (NUM(E in PseudoEstimateSet) + 1)).
6.3.4 Dealing with expired pseudonyms
Before every gossiping-cycle, or before making any calculations, a node
will check the T attached to every P in its PseudoEstimateSet and
PseudoCache and remove any Ps which have expired. If its own P has
expired it will generate a new P for itself, giving it the lifetime of thee
times the current mean of the E’s in the PseudoEstimateSet and resetting
the counter C to 0. If PseudoEstimateSet happens to be empty at the time
of creation it give P a lifetime of three times O.
6.3.5 Gossiping
Whenever a node a initiates a gossiping sequence it will choose a random
node b from either its PseudoCache or TN. The two nodes will then go
through the following steps:
1. Update their own estimate
2. Select a PseudoGossip set to send
3. Exchange PseudoGossip sets
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4. Determine which estimates are the newest
5. Apply PseudoGossip set to the PseudoCache
6. Apply PseudoGossip set to the PseudoEstimateSet
Updating their own estimates
Whenever a node is about to gossip its own P, which it does whenever it
gossips, it will check if its E has changed since last time it gossiped. If it has
changed it will replace the {E, C} pair attached to its P with a new {E, C} pair
where E equals the new E, and C is incremented by 1 from the previous C.
Selecting a PseudoGossip set
Nodes will exchange up the number of P slots in the PseudoGossip set.
A PseudoGossip set always includes the sending node’s P and will never
include duplicate Ps. The remaining slots are filled by randomly selecting
Ps from node’s PseudoCache until either all Ps in the PseudoCache have
been included, or until there are no more empty slots in the PseudoGossip
set. This is the same technique as presented in [35] and used in [33].
Determine which estimates are the newest
Upon receiving a PseudoGossip set a node will first search its PseudoCache
and PseudoEstimateSet for any duplicated Ps. For every duplicated P it
finds, it compares the C in the {E, C} pair attached to the Ps with each other.
It then replaces the {E, C} pair which contains the lowest C with the pair
containing the higher C. In case of a tie it does nothing. This ensures that
only the newest estimates are kept.
Applying a PseudoGossip set to the PseudoCache
Next it compares the Ps in received PseudoGossip set with the Ps in its
PseudoCache and removes any duplicates from the PseudoGossip set, as
well as its own P if it is present. If its PseudoCache contains any empty
slots it will then fill the empty slots with Ps from received PseudoGossip
set until the PseudoCache is full. If PseudoCache is, or becomes full, Ps
from PseudoGossip set will replace the Ps in the PseudoCache which where
chosen to go into the PseudoGossip which set which was sent during this
gossiping sequence. These are the same principle for gossiping described
in [35] and used in [33].
Applying a PseudoGossip set to the PseduoSet
For every P in remaining in the PseudoGossip set, the a node will compare
the id (i) of P with the id (i) of the P currently holding a first slot in the
PseudoEstimateSet. If the slot is currently empty the P will be inserted
into that slot. If there already is a P holding the slot the ids are compared
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to the i which is attached to the slot, and the P which has the id which is
numerically closest to the i of the slots gets the slot. In case of a tie the
P with the longest remaining T is chosen. This prosecess is then repeated
for every slot in the PseudoEstimateSet. This is equal to the technique for
selecting pseudonym links used in [33].
6.4 Reasoning behind design choices
In this section we elaborate on the choices we made to arrive upon the
protocol presented in Section 6.3. Some of these choices where clearly made
with the application context in mind and we elaborate some on how our
solution could be used in other application contexts in Section 6.6.
6.4.1 Choosing a selection
As established in Section 6.1 we needed a way to include offline nodes into
our estimates. As far as we know the only good way of doing this is to
have each node have data values from a selection of nodes which includes
offline nodes. This is similar to the approach taken in [2] with the exception
that we are also including offline nodes. However, unlike [2] we would like
to apply our technique to an unstructured P2P network. This means that in
addition to including offline nodes we also need a way of choosing nodes in
a such a way where every node appears about equally often in the samples.
If this is not the case estimates would be skewed towards the values held
by the nodes which appear more frequently than others. It is however not
crucial to ensure that individual nodes do not appear multiple times within
the same sample, as established in [13].
Our choice for selecting the individual samples fell on the principles
outlined by [4]. Using this approach we can have nodes make a selection
which statistically includes every node equally often into the selections.
It has the advantage of working in any P2P network regardless of how
the overlay is created, and as shown in [33] it can be used to create an
overlay networks which includes offline nodes. An added benefit is that
within our application context using this selection method does not add
any computational or message complexity.
We have no definitive answer for the best size of the sample. As pointed
out in [2] a bigger sample is better for accuracy, but can potentially result in
more stale information or higher message complexity to ensure freshness
in the sample. In [33] they found 50 to be a sufficient number for creating
a robust network overlay, and we found this to be sufficiently big for our
experiments. We do however explore the impact of different sample sizes
in Section 7.2.5.
6.4.2 How long to keep values from offline nodes
Determining how long a node’s value should remain in a sample is also a
non trivial task. Having sample values being valid for a long time is good
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for capturing values from nodes which are offline for long periods of time.
The drawback of this is that some nodes will never rejoin the system and
thus no longer relevant information is kept for longer. Time is also a relative
concept.
Following these arguments, how long estimates should be kept in a
sample should be relative to the estimated churn in the network. In [33]
they showed that having pseudonyms for the overlay links lasting three
times longer than the mean Toff time in the network was sufficient for
connectivity. This seemed like a reasonable time to keep the estimates,
though we also explore other times in Section 7.2.4. Returning to our
application context using the same ratio for pseudonym lifetimes as how
long to keep values in our estimate set allows us to couple these times
saying that a value for a certain pseudonym (each pseudonym represents a
node) can be kept as long as the pseudonym is valid.
6.4.3 Disseminating and updating values
Disseminating the values for the observation sets requires a gossiping
technique which allows for gossiping values from more than one node at
the time. If we where to limit nodes to only gossiping information about
themselves dissemination would be painstakingly slow, likewise gossiping
information about all nodes is of course also not practical if the network is
big. Thus we need a gossiping technique which gossips a set of data in an
efficient and robust manner. Our choice landed on the protocol proposed
in [35]. It is light weight, suits our needs and has the added benefit of being
the gossiping technique used in [33].
Having found a suitable gossiping technique we needed to address
how to update the values in the estimate sets. The easiest way would
be to simply have every node attach information about its Toff time every
time it creates a pseudonym for itself and not update this value until the
next time the node creates a pseudonym. This would however result
in estimates being made with increasingly stale information (assuming
that pseudonyms last for a while). In stead we let each pseudonym
be coupled with a {value, counter} pair. The value would as the name
implies represent the churn value while the counter would represent a
logical counter indicating when the {value, counter} pair was created. This
allows a node to update the value whenever it is gossiping its pseudonym,
indicating a new value by increasing the logical counter from the previous
iteration.
Using this formula aggregation data can be disseminated in the same
way as proposed in [33]. Using the same formula the aggregation receives
the same robustness to churn as the network overlay gets.
6.4.4 Estimation
Having established techniques for selecting a sample set and disseminating
and updating data through out the network we turned our attention to
the actual estimation. We could now use the technique proposed in [2] as
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we have a sample created in an similar fashion. The problem with using
this solution would be that every node would have to disclose information
about itself in a non privacy preserving manner. This would make it easy
to track individual nodes across pseudonyms, undermining the privacy-
preserving capabilities of the system. Our solution to this problem is to
borrow the averaging technique from [15]. In stead of every node gossiping
its own churn value it will in stead calculate a mean between its own value
and all the values which it has in its sample set. This is done in such a way
that the self observation will count for 1/(N + 1) part of the mean, where N
is the number of nodes in the sample set.
The benefits of doing this are twofold. First, we are addressing the
variation in estimates made by individual nodes which is present in [2].
This is because all values will converge towards the same number which
is one of the strong-suits of [15]. The estimates will not be perfectly even
as they have to include the nodes self observations, but a lot more uniform
than the distribution in estimates found in [2]. Secondly, by having every
node gossip approximately the same value over time tracking individual
nodes across pseudonyms becomes harder. Thus we are providing the
nodes with an anonymity set.
Another neat thing about our approach is that we can achieve a uniform
estimate like in [15] while being able to update individual values over
time and not have to restart the protocol. The ability to adapt to changes
in behaviour patterns by the nodes should also help in providing strong
anonymity sets as estimates will fluctuate a bit as a result of the protocol by
it self.
It is worth noting that when a node estimates the mean Toff time in
the network for the purpose of using the estimate for other means than
gossiping it will not include its self observation into the estimate. This is
because doing so would skew the results towards it own self observations
which is not desirable. More on this in Section 7.2.3.
6.5 Added computational and message complexity
Our proposed solution does not create or transmit any additional messages
compared to the protocol proposed in [33]. It does however slightly in-
crease the size of every message. How much is dependent on representa-
tion but if done correctly it should at most double the payload of a gossip-
message. This makes the size of l, ie how many pseudonyms we transmit
in every shuffle, the determining factor as far as message size is concerned.
This is no different than the existing protocol. There is of course also some
added computational complexity especially when comparing and applying
observations when gossiping, however if done in a correctly this should be
no worse than O(M log N) where M is the number of pseudonyms which
get gossiped and N is the number of pseudonyms in the cache plus the
number of pseudonyms in the overlay links.
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6.6 Usage outside the application context
Our approach could in theory be applied to estimate churn in any P2P net-
work. The gossiping method is probably the most easily interchangeable
part. The only requirement the protocol itself needs is some way of get-
ting the estimates to the nodes which are including them in their estim-
ation sets. Preferably the gossiping algorithm should also provide some
means by which provide updated estimates to the sets. We chose to use the
algorithm proposed by the authors of [35] as it is robust and lightweight
and was already in use, but other methods could in principle also be used.
We would recommend considering using the same gossiping and sampling
techniques which are used for creating the network overlay as these mech-
anisms typically are robust as they have to deal with churn.
The mechanism for selecting an estimate sample is a bit more critical.
The samples should be selected in such a way that every node appears
roughly an equal amount of times when combining all samples. In most
structured network this could simply be the network overlay combined
with some method for including offline nodes. Or if one does not wish to
include offline nodes one could maybe improve on the idea presented in
[2] with our averaging technique.
The benefit of not including offline nodes into the estimates set is that
one does not have to deal with how long estimates from offline nodes
should be kept in the sets. The drawback is that one is making estimates
based on less potentially relevant information (this is dependant on your
churn model).
If one does choose to include nodes which are not currently online into
the estimation sets one has to have some common notion of time and an
algorithm which guarantees that estimates from nodes which have not
been online for the set time period really do get removed from the system.
In our protocol this guarantee is made by the lifetime of the pseudonyms,
but other approaches are definitively possible. If the nodes have a common
notion of time one could for instance attach a timestamp in stead of the
logical counter to each estimate, and then remove any estimate which has
reached some time limit.
6.7 Summary
In this chapter we have outlined our solution for estimating mean Toff in
a privacy-preserving manner. We propose that every node can estimate
the mean Toff in the network by aggregating a sample of estimates from
other nodes. These samples can include estimates from nodes which
are currently offline, while having mechanisms in place to ensure that
estimates from nodes which have been unavailable for sufficiently long are
disregarded. We have also proposed a mechanism for updating estimates
from individual nodes over time to reflect any changes churn patterns. Our
solution is closely intertwined with the protocol proposed in [33], but as
discussed in Section 6.6 the techniques could also be applied to other P2P
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In this chapter we first present the configuration parameters for the
experiments and then define the performance metrics for connectivity and
estimation, before presenting evaluations of the protocol under different
conditions. This is followed by a brief summary before we present our
performance metrics for evaluating the privacy-preserving aspects of our
solution. We then go on to evaluate our solution by these performance
metrics, rounding up the chapter with a brief summary of the performance
of our solution.
7.1 Experimental environment
For our experiments we assume the presence of a perfectly working
anonymity and pseudonym service which allow for creation of high
bandwidth low latency links between nodes. Hence messages between
nodes are assumed to happen in a short time as long as both ends of a
link are online.
The time unit for our experiments is the frequency of how often the
gossiping protocol gets initiated by a single node, called a shuffle period.
This is chosen as the time unit because all important interactions in our
protocol happen at this frequency.
All experiments where run on our custom simulator, which is an event
driven simulator, where an event can happen at any time within the
duration of a single shuffle period. Shuffle periods are not synced between
individual nodes, but all nodes will shuffle at the same frequency as long
as they are online.
7.1.1 Trust graph
To simulate the social bonds between nodes we create a trust graph. The
graph is obtained by using the work presented by [36] which in turn was
created crawling friend lists of Facebook users. This gives us a good real-
life basis for the trust relations between nodes. From the Facebook trace we
in turn started at a random node and crawled the graph selecting a number
of contacts from each node until we met our desired number of nodes.
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The edges in the trust graph are the same as the edges in the Facebook
graph among the selected nodes. Meaning that if node a and b are friends
in the Facebook graph and both nodes are selected in our sample they will
be considered to be trusted by each other in our trust graph. It is also worth
noting that as our trust graph is created traversing existing nodes starting
from a single point, we have a connected network as the trust graph is a
undirected graph.
7.1.2 Churn
We assume that nodes have strong incentives for returning to the network
because they have common interests. Hence we model churn as the time a
node is online and how long it is offline. A node’s online time is how long
it will remain online once it has become online, hereafter Ton and its offline
time Toff is how long it remains offline once offline.
Artificial churn
Every individual node has a mean Ton and Toff time, but individual session
times will wary with an exponential distribution as proposed in [38]. A
nodes availability is calculated as Availability = Ton / (Ton + Toff) where
Ton is mean online time and Toff mean offline time. As we are trying
to estimate the Toff time we have given nodes a fixed Ton time unless
otherwise specified for all experiments presented in this thesis. The CDF
of the availability for the different experiments can be seen in Figure 7.1.
No nodes have more than about 90% availability and few or none have less
than 10% availability.
Real-life churn traces
To show that our protocol can work in a real life scenario we ran the
experiment using real-life churn traces from Skype presented in [31]. A
closer look at the traces revealed that a significant amount of nodes had
less than 1% availability as can be seen in Figure 7.2a. We felt that running
the system with so many nodes which had such a low availability would
not show the true potential of the system. Thus we removed the nodes
with availability less than 2% giving us the availability distribution shown
in Figure 7.2b. Doing so also meant that the mean availability of the nodes
went from 33.5% to 43% availability. To further adapt the trace to our notion
of time which is shuffle periods, we converted the values to be equivalent
of having a shuffle period every minute. This is because the trace has
relatively long session times and our protocol requires multiple sessions
to get an accurate number for the self-monitoring. We further replicated
the session times by repeating the churn patterns multiple times to get
sufficient number of shuffle periods as one run would only be equivalent
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(b) After removing nodes
Figure 7.2: CDF distribution of node availability in Skype traces from [31]
7.1.3 Default configuration parameters for proposed solution
For the majority of our experiments we have a set of default configuration
parameters, summarized in Table 7.1. These parameters can be assumed
as the settings for the experiments shown in this thesis unless specifically
stated otherwise. We have also included a range column for the values
which we do vary in some experiments.
As in [33] we have chosen a graph size of 1000 nodes. In [33] they tried
other sizes for the trust graph, but reported to find similar results with the
1000 node graph as with other sizes, and hence we have found 1000 nodes
to be a suitable number of nodes. The mean duration of Ton time has been
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Table 7.1: Default values for parameters in proposed solution
Parameter Default Range
Nodes in trust graph 1000
Mean Ton time in shuffle periods 10
Pseudonym lifetime ratio (* Toff) 3 3 - 9
Pseudonym cache size 400
Number of pseudonyms exchanged during a shuffle 40
Target number of pseudonyms in overlay links 50 25 - 75
Number of backups pr pseudonym in overlay links 5
set to the equivalent of 10 shuffle periods for all experiments not using real-
life churn traces. Increasing this number does not significantly increase or
change the performance of the system, however reducing this number will
at some point effect performance. We have not explored where this limit
goes as we consider this outside the scope of this thesis.
The pseudonym lifetime has been set to three times the estimated mean
Toff time at the time of pseudonym creation. This means that pseudonym
lifetimes will change over the duration of an experiment. Three times mean
Toff was chosen as a good number based on the work presented in [33].
With regards to shuffling we have a shuffle cache size of 400, and
exchange up to 40 pseudonyms in every gossip exchange. Every node will
try to get 50 pseudonym links in their overlay links, in addition to their
overlay links from the trust graph. Finally, every node tries to have up
to five backup pseudonyms for every possible pseudonym in the overlay
links. This helps with the connectivity at the beginning of the system and
with nodes that are offline for long periods at the time, but has no notable
effect on the majority of the nodes once the system has stabilized.
Nodes are also given the time equivalent to 100 shuffle periods to
monitor themselves before we start gossiping. Self monitoring is done
by monitoring and storing the last 50 Toff times in a ring-buffer and then
calculating the mean of these values. Initially nodes are given a value
equivalent to 90% availability, however this value gets overwritten by the
first value gained from self-monitoring.
7.1.4 Performance metrics for estimation
To show that our solution works we have two main goals. Firstly, we
want to show that our system can deliver a comparable performance to the
systems presented in [33], despite the nodes having no prior knowledge to
the mean Toff value and having to estimate this. Estimation can never be
as good as working with perfect information, which was the basis for the
experiments presented in [33], but good estimates can come close.
To to this we make comparisons in terms of node connectivity and
mean path length. Connectivity is calculated by checking how many of the
currently online nodes are connected to each other in terms of connected
components. If node A and B are both online and there is a way for node A
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to communicate with node B either directly or through intermediate nodes,
they belong to the same component in the graph. All nodes which can
communicate with either (and hence both) are also connected to the same
component. We then define the connectivity as the proportion of online
nodes which are connected to the largest connected component. Mean path
length is calculated by doing a BFS from all nodes in the largest connected
component.
The second goal is that every node should accurately estimate the same
Toff value, regardless of its own Toff value, and that this value should be
correct. It is also desirable that this should be achieved in a relatively short
timespan. To show this we provide two main metrics for evaluation. Firstly
how close is the mean of the estimated values to the mean of the values
gotten from self-monitoring over time. This is done by checking at certain
time intervals which value every single node would estimate as the system
wide mean Toff time and at the same point in time ask what its own Toff
time derived from self monitoring is. When averaged these numbers show
us how close our estimate is to the actual mean and how this develops over
time. This in turn allows us to see how fast the algorithm is converging.
We define convergence to be achieved either when the estimated values
are no longer changing, or the fluctuations in the estimates are showing a
recognisable pattern.
The second metric looks at the same values at certain points in time
and look at the distribution of the estimates compared to what the self-
monitoring shows. Coupled with the first metric this allows us to show
both how accurate the estimates are and that the variance in the estimate
distribution is low which indicates that all nodes are estimating well. We
also have some additional performance metric for privacy-preservation
which are covered in Section 7.4.
7.2 Experiments
In this section we are first showing that the system presented in [33] still
works, even when we are estimating the amount of churn in the network.
This is done by comparing the connectivity of the systems, presented in
Section 7.2.1, and comparing mean path lengths in the network, presented
in Section 7.2.2. We are then showing how our proposed protocol for
estimation is preforming under different scenarios. The main metrics
here are speed of convergence, accuracy of estimates and distribution of
estimates. We first present the performance using the default parameters
presented in Table 7.1, which are presented in Section 7.2.3. We then
take a closer look on the impact of pseudonym lifetime on the accuracy,
convergence and distribution in Section 7.2.4 followed by the impact of the
number of overlay links in Section 7.2.5. Finally we show how the system
is performing when run with churn traces taken from a real life system.
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7.2.1 Connectivity
To compare the connectivity of our protocol to the work presented in [33]
we ran the same experiments in two different scenarios. In the first one, we
gave every single node prior knowledge of the actual mean Toff time across
all nodes. This means that pseudonym lifetimes generated by all nodes is
always the same for all nodes. This is equal to the conditions found in the
experiments presented by [33]. In the second scenario none of the nodes
had any prior knowledge and we used our proposed protocol to estimate
the mean Toff time in the system based on the numbers that the nodes got
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(d) Mean availability 10%
Figure 7.3: Node connectivity over time
As we can see from Figure 7.3 the connectivity of the nodes in the
system is similar in both scenarios with slightly grater deviation for the
lower availability. This becomes more apparent when we look at the mean
connectivity of the systems over the duration of the experiment as seen
in Figure 7.4. The slight decrease in connectivity that we are seeing from
the proposed algorithm stems from the algorithm slightly underestimating
the mean Toff time, and as a result the pseudonyms which get generated do
not last as long as they would when using the fixed value. This is discussed
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Mean path length of overlay for nodes connected to main component
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Estimated pseudonym lifetime
Figure 7.5: Normalized mean path length for the duration of the experi-
ments
7.2.2 Mean path length
As we can see from Figure 7.5 the normalized mean path length of
the nodes in the single biggest connected component of the system also
remains almost unchanged when estimating mean Toff compared to having
a fixed Toff value. Combined with the results shown in 7.2.1 we see that
the performance of the system is essentially unchanged from introducing
estimating Toff compared to nodes having prior knowledge of these values.
7.2.3 Performance under artificial churn while self monitoring
In this section we focus on the performance of the proposed algorithm in
terms of our second group of performance metrics, namely that the nodes
are estimating the same Toff value and that this value is correct. This is
done using the artificial churn presented in Section 7.1.2.
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Actual mean Toff session time 89.60
Mean of all nodes self-monitoring
Mean of online nodes doing custom average
(d) Mean availability 10%
Figure 7.6: Convergence of proposed algorithm while self-monitoring
on an estimated Toff which is fairly accurate to the actual mean Toff as
calculated by self monitoring. The estimates get increasingly less accurate
as the availability decreases. This is because the nodes which have a low
availability and hence a high Toff value are not online sufficiently often to
get included into the mean of other nodes. Say that a node has an mean Toff
time of 100 shuffle periods. If the mean Toff across all nodes is estimated to
be 10 shuffle periods a pseudonym generated by our node will last for 30
shuffle periods. For those 30 shuffle periods the Toff value of the individual
node will be present in the system, but for the on average remaining 70
shuffle periods this value will not be propagated through the network. But
even with this deficiency the algorithm is still fairly accurate, even with a
mean availability of 10% and a fairly heavy skew in individual node Toff
time as visualized in Figure 7.1d.
An interesting observation can be made in Figure 7.6b. Here the
estimates are to high for the first 1500 cycles or so, before stabilising slightly
under the actual mean Toff after about 2500 cycles. Situations like these can
happen if nodes have extreme values which get propagated for a long time
unchanged. Consider the following scenario. A node has joined the system
for the first time after a long period of absence. The node has no valid
pseudonyms and has hence only the information from it’s self observation
to make decisions about. Based on this it creates a pseudonym with a very
long pseudonym lifetime for itself. It then gossips this pseudonym and its
estimate, which at this point will only be about itself, to one of its trusted
links and immediately goes offline. The pseudonym will be kept in the
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system for a long time as it has a long lifetime and the attached estimate
value will hence be kept equally long. Normally this would not be that big
of a problem as a online node would be able to propagate new estimates to
the network gradually sending less extreme estimates. But a offline node
can obviously not do so.
This extreme scenario can potentially happen at any point in time, but
is most likely to occur before the gossiping algorithm has run for very
long. If the system has been running for some time, all online nodes will
most likely have more pseudonyms in their cache than they gossip during
a single gossiping instance. A node with an extreme value will then in
a single turn have multiple less extreme values to base its estimate on,
meaning that starting from the next round of gossiping it will gossip a
much less extreme estimate value. If on the other hand the nodes are in
the start of the systems existence every gossiping cycle may only contain
a few pseudonyms. Having less pseudonyms and hence estimate values
to make an estimate from will most likely result in a more extreme value
being transmitted for longer, which in turn increases the chance that the
node will leave the system before proper estimate can be made.
To deal with these potential situations one should probably consider
making some minor adjustments to the protocol. For instance not gossiping
estimates before one has at least a certain number of other estimate values
as data points could be a possible solution. It is however important that one
also considers the impact any changes can make on the privacy preserving
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Figure 7.8: Distribution of estimated means over own value for online
nodes
Table 7.2: Standard deviation of estimates among online nodes in proposed
algorithm
Availability Proposed algorithm Actual mean Toff
70 % 0.004 4.1
50 % 0.010 9.9
20 % 0.048 37.7
10 % 0.215 89.6
Taking a look at our second performance metric again, the distribution
of the estimates, things look a lot better. As Shown in Figure 7.7, which
is a snapshot of all nodes at a single point in time, we observe that the
node’s observations are close to uniform across all nodes. Also worth
noting are the artefacts that can be observed in Figures 7.7b and 7.7d. These
are nodes which are offline and have been offline for so long that most
of their pseudonym links have expired, and hence have few or no other
observations for making a good estimate, or they have just recently again
become online after such a period, and has not yet shuffled sufficiently
many times to replace the dead links. If we take the same snapshot, this
time only including nodes which are online at the time of the snapshot
we get the plot in Figure 7.8. As we can see the artefacts observed earlier
are gone, and the estimates are even more uniform. This is observed even























Mean Toff time in shuffle periods
Distribution after 5000 shuffle periods, all nodes
Node


























Mean Toff time in shuffle periods
Distribution after 5000 shuffle periods, all nodes
Node























Mean Toff time in shuffle periods
Distribution after 5000 shuffle periods, all nodes
Node























Mean Toff time in shuffle periods
Distribution after 5000 shuffle periods, all nodes
Node
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Figure 7.9: Distribution of estimated means over own value for all nodes
when including own estimate in the average
As mentioned in Section 6.4.4, we do not include a node’s own
observation about itself when estimating what the system wide mean
is. The reason for this becomes apparent when comparing the graphs
from Figure 7.9 and 7.7. When including its own observation from self-
monitoring we get a less uniform estimate across the nodes with a slight
tendency towards a nodes own Toff value. This can be seen in Figure
7.9. This tendency is not surprising considering that the calculated mean
includes a node’s own Toff value, where this value in this case will make
out 1/51 of the mean. What makes Figure 7.9 really interesting though is
that these are the values which the individual nodes would report as its
observations about itself to other nodes. This also means that the number
of pseudonym links individual nodes keep in their overlay links has an
effect on how accurate the estimates are. We go more into this in Section
7.2.5.
7.2.4 Pseudonym lifetimes effect on accuracy
In this section we show how the solution performs if we increase the
pseudonym lifetime. We will focus on the lower availability graphs, and
show how the system preforms when letting pseudonyms last 3 (default),
6 and 9 times longer than the estimated mean Toff time. The first thing we
notice in Figure 7.10 is that the system takes a lot longer to converge the
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(b) Mean availability 10%
Figure 7.10: Convergence of proposed algorithm while self-monitoring,
with different pseudonym lifetime ratios
overlay works. A node will only replace a overlay link once it either has
a better numerical match for the slot in the overlay, or that the existing
pseudonym link expires. As pseudonym lifetimes increases the time
between introduction of new pseudonym also increases resulting in little
change in the composition of the overlay topology. Random graphs are
known for their theoretically short path lengths between nodes, but under
heavy churn a lot of these paths will be unavailable for communication for
long time periods creating longer path lengths between the online nodes
which again results in slower convergence. In addition to this nodes will
also keep stale information much longer in their overlay than they would
with shorter pseudonym lifetimes as new information about estimate
values also will take more time to get propagated through the network
when path lengths are increasing. If one needs long pseudonym lifetimes
one might want to explore the effects of additional pull mechanisms for
nodes toward pseudonyms for which there has not been updated estimate
values for some time. The benefit of having longer pseudonym lifetimes
is that the estimate once converged becomes slightly more accurate the
more we increase the pseudonym lifetime as we can see from Figure
7.10a. This is because observations from low availability nodes have more
time to get disseminated through the network before they expire. And
more importantly, low availability nodes are represented for longer in the
overlay as their pseudonyms last longer. Nodes also do not need to be
online as often to renew their pseudonyms and still maintain the same
presence in the overlay. The distribution of the estimates are pretty much
the same as before.
7.2.5 Overlay sizes effect on accuracy
The number of pseudonym links each node maintains will of course have
a certain effect on how accurate the estimates are. Generally speaking
more is better in terms of accuracy as we are basing our estimates on
more information, however with a bigger overlay we also create more
computational overhead for each node. In Figure 7.11 we have plotted





















Time in shuffle periods
Actual mean Toff session time 4.10
Mean of all nodes self-monitoring
Mean of online nodes, pseudonym links 25
Mean of online nodes, pseudonym links 50
Mean of online nodes, pseudonym links 75




















Time in shuffle periods
Actual mean Toff session time 9.80
Mean of all nodes self-monitoring
Mean of online nodes, pseudonym links 25
Mean of online nodes, pseudonym links 50
Mean of online nodes, pseudonym links 75




















Time in shuffle periods
Actual mean Toff session time 37.70
Mean of all nodes self-monitoring
Mean of online nodes, pseudonym links 25
Mean of online nodes, pseudonym links 50
Mean of online nodes, pseudonym links 75






















Time in shuffle periods
Actual mean Toff session time 89.60
Mean of all nodes self-monitoring
Mean of online nodes, pseudonym links 25
Mean of online nodes, pseudonym links 50
Mean of online nodes, pseudonym links 75
(d) Mean availability 10%
Figure 7.11: Convergence of proposed algorithm while self-monitoring
Toff, with different number of pseudonym links
most apparent trend is that when reducing the number of pseudonym links
in the overlay links to 25 the accuracy of the estimate suffers. The estimates
are also less stable over time. This is because if one of the pseudonyms
expire a node will replace a much bigger part of its base than with bigger








































Distribution after 5000 shuffle periods, online nodes
Nodes
(b) Online nodes
Figure 7.12: Distribution of estimated mean over own value, 25 pseudonym
links, availability 20%
And as we can see form Figure 7.12 the distributions of the estimates
become less uniform when decreasing the number of pseudonym links.
Looking at the performance when increasing the number of pseudonym









































Distribution after 5000 shuffle periods, online nodes
Nodes
(b) Online nodes
Figure 7.13: Distribution of estimated mean over own value, 75 pseudonym
links, availability 20%
Table 7.3: Standard deviation of estimate among online nodes with
different number of pseudonym links pr node
Availability 25 links 50 links 75 links Actual mean Toff
70 % 0.047 0.004 0.004 4.1
50 % 0.330 0.057 0.015 9.9
20 % 0.143 0.122 0.031 37.7
10 % 0.365 0.166 0.148 89.6
availability decreases the time it takes to converge increases significantly
when we increase the number of pseudonym links. The reason for this is a
bit similar to when we increase the pseudonym lifetime. We will store more
stale information. This time it is not for a longer period of time, but from
more nodes, and frequently online nodes will make up a larger proportion
of the individual overlays as their pseudonyms will be replaced quicker
when they expire, skewing the results for longer. Once the estimates have
converged this is no longer a problem as low availability nodes have a
sufficiently big window in which to replace a pseudonym. This of course
assuming that not all pseudonyms from low availability nodes expire at the
same time. The standard deviation of estimates is also being affected by the
number of pseudonym links in the overlay, getting better as we increase the
number of pseudonym links as we see from Table 7.3.
7.2.6 Performance under real-life churn using Skype traces
As we can se in Figure 7.14 the estimate is off by quite a bit from the actual
mean Toff time. This is because there is no point in time where all the
low availability nodes are online at the same time which we also show in
the Figure 7.14. We have also introduced another metric to compare the
accuracy of the estimates to, which is the mean of all nodes which have
been online at some point during the last three times mean Toff time in
the network. The idea is that if the estimates are correct, a pseudonym






















Time in shuffle periods
Actual mean Toff session time 274 shuffle periods
All nodes self-monitoring
Mean of online nodes
Nodes which have been online within the last 822 SP
Figure 7.14: Convergence when using churn from Skype traces presented
in [31]
observations from nodes which do not have a valid pseudonym in the
network because nodes without a valid pseudonym can not appear in a
nodes pseudonym links. To illustrate why we have to do this Figure 7.15a
show the CDF distribution of the mean Toff times for individual nodes. If
we now compare the estimate to the mean of the nodes which are actually
online and the mean of the nodes which potentially should have a valid
pseudonym in the network if our estimates where estimating correctly,
our estimates are reasonably close. It is especially worth noting that the
estimates adapts to the periodical peaks with a slight delay. This delay is to

















Mean Toff in shuffle periods
Skype node mean Toff CDF























Mean Toff time in shuffle periods
Distribution after 40000 shuffle periods, online nodes
Nodes
(b) Distribution of estimates
Figure 7.15: Mean Toff distribution and estimate distribution with Skype
traces presented in [31]
Turning to our second performance metric again, which is the distri-
bution of the estimates, we get Figure 7.15b. We for the first time see two
artefacts, most likely because the nodes have just recently rejoined the sys-
tem after a long period of absence, but otherwise the distribution is as with
the previous experiments using synthetic churn.
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7.3 Summary of estimation performance
So far in this chapter we have shown that it is possible to estimate the mean
Toff time with reasonable accuracy and within a reasonable time. We have
shown that we can achieve similar connectivity and path lengths while
estimating as when giving the system perfect information. The accuracy of
the estimates are only mildly affected by the size of the network overlay
and the length of pseudonyms lifetimes, and all nodes are estimating
approximately the same value regardless of their own availability with
very low standard deviation. Speed of convergence is directly related to
pseudonym creation and lifetime, but once stabilized the system remains
stable, and as we can see from Section 7.2.6 the system will adapt to changes
in the churn. We have also shown that our algorithm for estimating churn
works both under quite extreme and skewed churn scenarios, as well as
under churn based on real life traces.
7.4 Privacy-preservation
Estimating churn of a F2F network in a privacy-preserving manner will
always be challenging. If we where to do it over the trust graph only it
would take a significant time to converge, especially under heavy churn.
When utilizing the overlay links we are to a certain extent compromising
the privacy provided by the expiring pseudonyms, however we are
converging on a correct value a lot faster, even under heavy churn. One of
the neat things with our solution is that if a node does not have any valid
pseudonym links it can only gossip with trusted links, where disclosing
its actual mean Toff time is not violating privacy, and once the node has
pseudonym links to gossip with, the nodes mean Toff gets hidden among
the other observations, an anonymity set.
7.4.1 Performance metrics for privacy-preservation
As pointed out by the authors of [32] and [8] when evaluating the strength
of an anonymity set one should consider both the probability an potential
attacker would assign to each individual in the set as well as the number of
individuals in the set. We hence need to evaluate both the strength of the
set and the size of the set.
The metric for the strength of a set should be a threshold for the
minimum probability an attacker would give any given individual in the
set. Say that we are looking at a data set as an potential attacker, and we
are looking for a individual node in this set. For each node we attach a
probability between 0 and 1 for being the node we are looking for. We
give node x a probability of 0.2 for being the node we are looking for.
Node x would be a part of the anonymity set of the node which the
attacker is looking for if the threshold is anywhere below 20% but would
not be a part of this set if the threshold is higher. Having a generic way
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of calculating these thresholds is important if one wants to compare the
privacy-preserving capabilities of different estimation algorithms.
Over time a individual node will gossip a lot of observations to other
nodes. By monitoring these values for individual nodes we can calculate
the mean value transmitted by that node and then calculate the standard
deviation of those observations. We define that to be within the anonymity
set of each other two nodes have to transmit values within the same range.
We further limit this range to any value transmitted within two times the
standard deviation of two nodes means. Assuming a normal distribution
this is statistically 96% of all values. By doing this we are effectively
excluding any extreme values transmitted by nodes. We define the strength
of the set as the probability for a message from any of the two nodes to be
within this range.
Say that node A has a standard deviation of 1 with mean 1. Node B also
has a standard deviation of 1 but a mean of 2. This means that according
to our definition node A has a range from 3 to -1 (mean +/- standard
deviation), while node B has a range from 4 to 0. The overlap between node
A and node B is hence the range from 3 to 0. The probability for the nodes
to transmit a value within this range is p(x) = (Ax/Atotal) ∗ (Bx/Btotal)
where x is the number of messages which fall within the overlap range and
total is the total number of messages sent by the node.
7.5 Evaluating privacy-preservation
7.5.1 Set strength
As pointed out in [32] and [8] when evaluating or comparing anonymity
sets the strength of the set needs to be considered. The statistically
maximum set strength which can be achieved with our definition of set
strength is 0.92 assuming a normal distribution of the values. This is a
result of how standard deviation is calculated (See Section 2.6 for a brief
introduction). We chose our definition for calculating set strength to be
bound by the standard deviation to limit extreme values in the data sets
to create unreasonable large overlap areas. The main drawback with our
definition, as far as we can see, is that it assuming a reasonable spread
of the values within the standard deviation. If nodes where to always
transmit individually distinguishable values within our range then an
attacker would be able to give different probabilities than the ones we
are calculating he would. However, manually evaluating sets looking for
patterns is not really a option when trying to compare large data sets, so
we feel confidant that our metric is a good way of calculating set strengths
of anonymity sets.
Achieving a set strength of 0.92 is possible if two nodes have the same
mean and the same standard deviation. In this case statistically speaking
96% of the values fall within the range giving us the probability of P(x)
= (96/100 * 96/100) = 0.92. To show the degree of anonymity which can
potentially be provided by the algorithm we will focus on three thresholds:
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75%, 50% and 25%. If we take the 50% threshold as an example. This means
that for a node to be considered a part of the anonymity set of another node
if you take any single value transmitted by either node there has to be an
at least 50% chance that this value was within the set range. Having this
guarantee we can now truly start to evaluate the anonymity provided by
the number of nodes in the set.
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(d) Mean availability 10%
Figure 7.16: Proposed algorithm, mean estimate and standard deviation
over time
In Figure 7.16 we have calculated the mean of the values which a node
transmits once the system has converged with the standard deviation of
this mean. As we can see from the Figure the distributions are fairly even,
which indicates that tracking individual nodes across pseudonyms based
by transmitted values should be fairly complicated. The exception to this
are the nodes on the extreme edge of the scale. This is especially true for
the low availability nodes which we find in Figure 7.16c and 7.16d.
Turning to Figure 7.17 it becomes more apparent how close the
distributions are when we calculate the anonymity set sizes and plot them in
a CDF manner. As we can see the anonymity set sizes are slightly bigger for
the high availability scenarios. Focusing on the low availability scenarios
in Figure 7.17c and 7.17d we see that for the 50% set strength only 10%
of the nodes have a set size smaller than 200 nodes. If a 75% set strength





















































































(d) Mean availability 10%
Figure 7.17: Anonymity set size
100 nodes looking to our worst case scenario in Figure 7.17d.
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(b) Node anonymity set size CDF
Figure 7.18: Mean estimate and standard deviation and anonymity set size
of Skype traces presented in [31]
Calculating the privacy-preserving capabilities of the proposed al-
gorithm under using the real-life churn traces presented in [31] we get
Figure 7.18. By our definition the estimates of the Skype trace converged
after approximately 20.000 shuffle cycles, so the calculations are means cap-
tured from that moment onward. As the estimates them selves fluctuate
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over time (see Figure 7.14) the standard deviation of the individual nodes
is fairly high compared to the figures we where seeing from the artificial
churn (Figure 7.16). The exception are some very low availability nodes for
which are online very few times during the experiment and for which we
hence have few data points. These nodes have an extreme standard devi-
ation. Regardless, the big standard deviations mean that the anonymity set
size of individual nodes gets very high as we can see from Figure 7.18b. As
we can see the situation for the 75% set strength the situation is about the
same as seen in Figure 7.17d. Only 20% of the nodes have an anonymity set
size of less than 100 nodes. The situation is similar for the set strengths of
50% and 25% though more nodes have bigger set sizes than in our artificial
scenario.
7.6 Evaluation summary
In this chapter we have shown that our proposed solution for estimating
churn in a privacy-preserving manner works in both artificial churn
scenarios as well as scenarios created using real-life churn traces. The
protocol delivers reasonable accurate estimates within a short time span,
and adapts to changing churn values without having to restart or running
multiple instances of the protocol. The solution is also privacy-preserving
for the vast majority of the nodes in the network, though one might want
to take some additional measures for nodes being on the extreme lower
edges of the availability scale. The reason for this is mostly that these nodes
are unavailable for so long that when they come back online they do not
have any valid pseudonyms left in their network overlay. Not transmitting
values before one has reached some threshold in number of pseudonyms
observation set could be a possible approach. Or only gossiping with
trusted nodes until some threshold is reached. But all in all we are feeling
confident that our solution is a good one.
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Part III




Conclusion and future work
8.1 Conclusion
In this thesis we set out to take the basis for a protocol which allows
for robust privacy-preserving data dissemination over a social graph
presented in [33] one step closer to a complete working system. More
specifically we set out to show that it is possible to estimate the mean
Toff time in such a system in an efficient and accurate manner, without
compromising the privacy-preserving elements of the system. To the best
of our knowledge this is the first protocol which allows for the estimation
of churn in large scale P2P network in a privacy preserving manner.
Our solution works by having participating nodes observe their own
behaviour patterns in terms of Toff time, and then disseminate this
information through the network. To do this in a privacy-preserving
manner nodes will compute a mean between their own observation about
them selves and the observations disseminated to them from their overlay
neighbours in the network before gossiping their observation to other
nodes. This ensures that the observations disseminated are fairly uniform
across all nodes, making it hard or near impossible to track individual
nodes based on their observations about themselves. Nodes will finally
use the observations received from its overlay neighbours to estimate the
mean Toff time in the network.
We have shown that the algorithm will converge within a reasonable
time given the churn scenario, and once it has converged all nodes will
estimate the same mean Toff across the system with a very low standard
deviation among the estimates. Our solution is also robust as it works
in scenarios with high churn as it has the same robustness properties as
the work presented in [33] as it uses the same gossiping and sampling
techniques.
The accuracy of the estimates will decline somewhat as the churn
increases, however this can be remedied by increasing the time in which
observations are valid (pseudonym lifetime in this work). Accuracy does
however come at the cost of speed of convergence and how fast the system
adapts to changes in the observations. Another way of potentially adapting
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the system to be more accurate in its estimate would be to vary the sample
size. Bigger samples (number of observations) are more accurate both in
terms of standard deviation and estimated value, however this also makes
the system slower to converge and less responsive to change.
We have also introduced a new metric for evaluating the degree of
privacy an anonymity set will provide, based on the probability that two
nodes will transmit an indistinguishable numerical value. Having such a
generic metric for anonymity sets enables the comparison of the privacy-
preserving capabilities of different estimation and aggregation algorithms
in a fair way as one can evaluate both the size of the set and the degree
of privacy it provides. And as shown in Section 7.5 our protocol preserver
node privacy by providing large anonymity sets for the majority of nodes
according to our metric.
In this thesis we have concentrated on the estimation of mean Toff in the
network, however we see no reason why our approach should lend itself
to estimating other parameters as well.
8.2 Future work
There are some issues with our protocol which deserve some future
attention. There should probably be some upper bound on how long
estimates should be valid or a requirement for a certain amount of
estimates to be in a node’s observation set before it provides an estimate
of its own, as suggested in Section 7.2.3.
Equally the privacy-preservation of the low availability nodes with
small anonymity sets should be considered further. As it is the protocol
provides large anonymity sets for the majority of nodes, but a small minor-
ity deserves some future attention to ensure that the estimation protocol
does not compromise their privacy preservation as well. Gossiping only
over trusted links until a node has reached a certain threshold of pseud-
onym links could be a path worth exploring.
In this thesis we have concentrated on a solution for estimation of
global parameters in privacy-preserving networks. However our approach
could be used as an estimation technique for estimating churn also in
P2P networks which do not require the privacy preserving capabilities.
Especially networks which could utilize the approach proposed by [2]
could benefit from our algorithm to get a more uniform estimate across all
nodes, but this would have to be explored further. It could potentially also
be interesting to utilize our algorithm in systems which uses the algorithm
proposed in [15]. The potential benefit would be to have an algorithm that
performs better under churn, and without the need for running multiple
parallel instances of the algorithm. The drawback is of course that our
algorithm requires more complex structures and gossiping methods than
the solution proposed in [15].
If limiting ourselves to the work proposed by [33], for which this
protocol was designed, using the estimates to preform self-adaptation
could potentially be interesting. If a node for instance sees a lot of small
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fluctuations in the estimated mean, such as can be noticed in Figure 7.11
when examining the lines for 25 pseudonym links more closely, it could
deduce that its number of overlay links is a bit to small for the network
and increase the number of pseudonym links it maintains. Similarly if
nodes where to observe periodical fluctuations, such as we observe in 7.14,
nodes could deduce that there are a lot of nodes which have some very
long mean Toff times and increase the pseudonym lifetime ratio to achieve
better connectivity for these nodes.
Our metric for calculating set strengths could probably also benefit from
some future polishing and refinement.
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